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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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.

WASATCH MINES COMPANY,
a corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent :
and cross-Appellant,
:

.
.
.
.•

vs.
WILLIAM HOPKINSON,
an individual,
Defendant and Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

CASE NO. 11599

:
:

.
.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff sued Defendant for payment for 1600 tons of top soil removed from
1

Plaintiff's land.

Defendant counterclaimed

for damages for Plaintiff's breach of a
written agreement, including amendments,
granting him the right to remove top soil
from Plaintiff's land for a period of 25
years and for confirmation of said right.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried in the
District Court for Salt Lake County before
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson sitting without a jury.
As to the Plaintiff's claim, the
Court found the facts in Defendant's favor,
viz., the terms of the agreement concerning
the payment for the 1600 tons of soil were
that Defendant was not required to pay for

2

it until he sold it; he had paid for that
which he had sold, and therefore, there was
no money due the Plaintiff for the balance
of the 1600 tons which had not been sold.
The Court further found that Plaintiff 'a
claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
As to the Defendant's claims, the
Court ruled as a matter of law that the terms
of the grant of the right to remove soil were
so vague and uncertain as to render it unenforceable; and further, that the damages
claimed were too speculative to determine.
The Court did not specifically rule on Defendant's prayer for declaratory relief confirming his right to remove soil, but in holding
the terms were too vague and uncertain for
enforcement, it denied this right.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant requests the Supreme
3

Court of Utah to reverse the decision of the
Lower Court as to the counterclaim and hold
as a matter of law that the tenns of the
agreement for the removal of soil are not
vague and uncertain and incapable of enforcement, but on the contrary, establish a definite and enforceable right to the soil on
the land (known as a profit a prendre): and
further, that the damages claimed are not
too speculative so as to be incapable of
determination.
Also, as respects Plaintiff's
cross-appeal, Defendant requests the Court
to affirm the Trial court's Findings and
Judgment against the Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff, Wasatch Mines
Company, is the owner in fee of certain
patented lode mining claims located in the
4

vicinity of the Wasatch Drain Tunnel in Little
Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake County (R. 7,
9), about 78 claims of 20 acres each (R.

159).

In September, 1954, the Defendant

and the Plaintiff and Alta Wasatch Development Company, the owner of the mineral
rights to the area, entered into a written
lease agreement granting the Defendant a
two-year period in which to take the soil
from Plaintiff's land around the drain
tunnel at $6.00 per ton for resale as top
soil (R. 117, 118).

This lease was not

introduced at trial because it had been
lost (R. 117, 144).
During the period of 1954-56, the
term granted in the lease, the Defendant made
significant strides in processing and developing the soil for sale as a profitable commodity.

He developed a market in Las Vegas,

Nevada, and sold a lot of the top soil in
5

bags of various sizes and prices and gave

some away to prove its value (R. 123, 124).
Defendant testified (and there was no
evidence to the contrary) that the soil
was used as an additive and obtained excellent
results on trees, bushes, roses, lawns, etc.,
and that after two years, it had tremendous
value (R. 123).
As a result of the success of the
first two years, a second document was executed February 9, 1956, entitled "Lease Amendment", which amended the lease of 1954, which
was lost (R. 118, 119, 124: Exh. D-3).

This

amendment increased the boundaries of the
first lease by including all of the area
(not just around the drain tunnel) of Plaintiff's mining claims (78 claims of 20 acres
each, R. 159) that soil was removable without damage to buildings or installations on
the property or interference with mine
6

dumpings.

Also, it provided for a 25-year

term with option to renew on the same basis.
It was non-assignable, but the right to the
soil was inheritable in Defendant's sons.
Defendant was to pay $6.00 per ton for soil
removed, $2.00 to go to Alta Wasatch Company
and $4.00 to the Plaintiff.

There was also

provision for sharing profits in the event
minerals were encountered as a result of the
soil removal.

This document, Exhibit Dr3,

contains the signatures of the presidents
and secretaries and also the seals of the
Plaintiff and Alta Wasatch Development
Company, the owner of the mineral rights,
and was recorded in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's office (Exh. D-3).
In September of 1958, Defendant
proposed to the Plaintiff at a meeting of
the Board of Directors that he remove about
1600 tons of soil and stockpile it in Midvale,
7

Utah, so that it would be available for
future sales when the weather wouldn't
permit one to get up to Little Cottonwood
Canyon to get the soil.

At this point,

there was a dispute of facts at the trial.
Defendant's claim was that since he was only
going to stockpile it for future sales that
the parties had agreed that he would pay for
it as he sold it from the stockpile (R. 83,
86, 87, 97).

Plaintiff's position was that

since Defendant had always paid for it as
he removed it from Plaintiff's land, the
same arrangement applied as respects the
1600 ton stockpile and therefore, Defendant

owed for the soil (R. 105).

On this disputed

issue of fact, the Trial Court found in
Defendant's favor, i.e. that the parties
had agreed that as respects the soil in the
stockpile, Defendant would pay for it as he
sold it(R. 68).
8

Exhibits D-4 and D-7 constitute
further amendments to the grant of the right
to remove the soil, upon which the counterclaim is based.

They are dated February 11,

1959, and March 1, 1959, and were drafted
for the purpose of reducing the $6.00 a ton
price by 20 per cent to allow for a moisture
content of the soil (R. 124, 125).

The

proceeds were to be divided $1.60 to the
Plaintiff, $1.60 to Alta Wasatch Development Company, and $1.60 to the Defendant
(Exh. D-7).

Exhibit D-7 was Defendant's copy

of the amendment and is signed by the Plaintiff and Alta Wasatch Development Company.
The original of Exhibit D-7 was signed by
the Defendant also (R. 126).
The above-mentioned documents,
viz., the two-year lease agreement of 1954,
(the lost document), the 25-year extension
of 1956 (Exhibit D-3), and the amendments
9

of 1959 (Exhs. D-4 and D-7), supported by
the course of conduct of the parties under
these documents, are the bases of Defendant•s
counterclaim, claiming the right to the soil
upon the land of the Plaintiff.

As to the time

of Plaintiff's breach of the same, i t probably
occurred in 1963 or 1964, although there are
indications in the record that at least some
of the members of the Plaintiff were dissatif ied with their agreement as far back as
September,

1956 (See Exhs.05 andI6).

But

essentially, Defendant removed soil from
Plaintiff 1s land pursuant to the above documents up until the fall of 1963 (R. 131).
The record shows that Plaintiff was trying
to stop Defendant from removing soil in
September, 1963 (R. 138), and although soil
was removed after that in the same year,
Plaintiff refused to allow any further
removals after August of 1964 (Exh. D-9:

10

R. 130).

Likewise, Defendant has not

sold any more soil from the 1600 ton stock-

pile because of inability to obtain a large
buyer for it without access to more (R.
166,

167).

At any rate, Plaintiff admitted

in its reply to the counterclaim that it
had repudiated Defendant's claimed rights as
hereinabove set forth (R. 9).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT GRANTING
THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO THE SOIL ON PLAINTl FF' S LAND WERE TOO VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN FOR
ENFORCEMENT.
As stated in the Statement of Facts
above, Defendant bases his right to remove the
soil from Plaintiff's land upon the written
lease agreement of 1954 (lost document), the
written extension of 1956 (Exh.D3) and the
written amendments of 1959 (Exhs.D4 and07).
11

The Lower Court's ruling against him as a
matter of law was because the terms were
said to be too "vague and uncertain" for
enforcement.
There is no need here for a lengthy
discussion of the terms, as the documents
speak for themselves.

In order to assist

in the determination that there is no vagueness or uncertainty involved, these terms
for the removal of soil by the Defendant
are summarized as follows:
(a)

Duration:

Two years granted

in 1954: an additional 25 years granted in

1956 with option to renew on same basis:

(b)

Area of Grant or Quantity:

There is no quantity limit.

The grant is

for all soil in area of claims owned by
Plaintiff, 78 claims of 20 acres each in
Little cottonwood Canyon near the Wasatch
Drain Tunnel: formerly, under the 1954

12

agreement, the boundaries were limited to
the area directly around the drain tunnel,
but the 1956 extension added the total area.l
(c)
of

Parties:

The Plaintiff, owner

the land, and Alta Wasatch Development

Company, owner of the mineral rights, Granters,
and the Defendant, Grantee.

The 1956 amend-

ment added Defendant's sons and they had the
exclusive right to the soil.
(d)

Inheritable or Assignable:

The

right to remove the soil was non-assignable,
but it was inheritable.
(e)

Price and Division of Profits:

Originally it was $6.00 per ton, split 2/3
and 1/3 between Plaintiff and Alta Wasatch
Development Company respectively: then it
1

That grants describing land as "all my property" in a given area and similar descriptions
constitute sufficient legal descriptions and
that courts construe descriptions liberally to
uphold them, see generally 23 Am.Jur.2d, Deeds,
sections under topic IX, Descriptions of Proper·
ty, and cases there cited, particularly sections 222 and 231.
13

was changed to $4.80 a ton,

split equally

three ways between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant and Alta Wasatch Development
company.

Any mineral deposits encountered

were to be claimed by Alta Wasatch Development Company with Plaintiff receiving a 15%
roya 1 ty.
How the terms could be any more
definite, clear or certain is difficult to
conceive, and the Court erred in failing to
confirm Plaintiff's right to continue to
remove soil pursuant to those terms.
tedly,

Admit-

the documents appear to be home drawn

and lack legal finesse, but it is a wellestablished rule of law that courts do not look
kindly on the destruction of agreements Of
11-;:igants on the ground of vagueness or uncertainty of the terms.

In American Juris-

prudence 2d, we read:
The determination that an agree-

14

ment is sufficiently definite is favored.

Therefore, the courts will, if possible,
so construe the agreement as to carry
into effect the reasonable intention
of the parties, if that can be ascertained. The law leans against the
destruction of contracts for uncertainty, particularly where one of the parties has performed his part of the
contract.
17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts,
section 75.

In the present case, not only are the terms
clear and definite, as set out above, but the
narties operated thereunder for many years
prior to Plaintiff's breach.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO REMOVE SOIL IS

PROFIT A' PRENDRE, AND AS SUCH, SHOULD BE
DECLARED VALID AND RECOGNIZED IN THE STATE
OF UTAH.
1\

A profit a' prendre is the right
to remove soil from the land of another,

2

and

in counsel's trial brief and closing arguments to the Lower Court, it was argued that
generally 34 Words and Phrases, Profit
a' Prendre, pp.
25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements,
and Licenses, section 4.
15

the parties had created such an interest.
lt is felt that the Lower Court's failure
to confirm Defendant's right to remove the

soil from Plaintiff's land is because there
is very little case law in the State of Utah
on

the law of profit a' prendre, and the

Court was therefore unfamiliar with it. 3
It is submitted that in the instant case, the

Trial Court erred in refusing declaratory
relief as to Defendant's counterclaim and
failing to hold that the documents and facts
discussed above created a profit a' prendre.
In a case based on a prayer for
declaratory relief, as here, with practically
identical facts to those in the present case,

viz., an agreement in writing under seal,
granting the exclusive right to remove soil
3onLy two Utah cases have been located on the

subject; though both recognize the doctrine of
profit a' prendre, neither define it adequately.
as has been done in other states.
Haynes v.
Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 85 P.2d 861 (1939); Deseret
v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 259 P.2d 607
(1953).

for a definite term, with an option to renew,

a definite price dependent on the quantity
removed, a prohibition against assignment, and

under which the parties operated for a number
of years,

the Court in holding that the parties

had created a profit a' prendre observed in
Moore v. Schultz, 22 N.J. Sup. 24, 91 A.2d
514 ( 1952):

Moreover the agreement was executed
under seal, acknowledged and recorded,
all of which are the appropriate formalities in the creation of an incorporeal
interest. There is often something of
implication in the use of language and
in the conduct of the contracting parties in the search for their intentions.
Quarry rights, mining rights, oil rights,
and other similar rights relating to the
severance of the physical substances of a
servient tenement are normally more commonly interests a' prendre appurtenant
or in gross, or easements in gross.
Our study of the agreement, our conception of the exclusive character of the
right granted and its distinctive nature,
have guided us to the conclusion that the
so-called privilege which was invested in
Schultz was in the law within the category
of a right of profit a' prendre in gross,
17

sometimes more modernly and liberally
designated as an easement in gross.
2 American Law of Property (1952) §8.9,
et seq., pp. 235, et seq.: Thompson, Real
Property (1939) §§250, 260, 264 and 268;
Tiffany, Real Property (1939) §§842, 843;
Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227
N.Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834 (Ct.App. 1920).
Cf. Wenger v. Clay Tp. of St. Joseph
County, 61 Ind. App. 640, 112 N.E. 402
(Ind. App. Ct. 1916).
Moreover,

the ldbel placed on the

agreement by the parties 4 or the fact that
words of grant are absent. or where the instrurnent is prepared by a layman, as here, do
invalidate the profit a'

but the

language should be construed as a whole to
determine the relationEhip the parties intended
to create.

In Minnesota Valley Gun Club v.

Northline corporation,
222

(1940),

207 Minn.

126, 290

the Court observed:

4

Note that the exhibits and the record
refer to Defendant's right to take the soil
variously as "lease", "lease amendment",
"agreement", "agency agreement", "soil
lease", "contract
etc.
11

,

18

Although customary words of grant are
absent, it must be remembered the draftsman was a layman. The confusing use of
"landlord", "license'', "indenture", "right'
and "privilege" leaves little to rely upon
as a basis for decision.
In addition, it
is a persuasive reason why too much relianc
cannot be placed upon the language employed.
Reading the instrument as a unit,
it satisfactorily conveys the conception
that a more substantial relationship was
intended than defendant concedes. The
particular items mentioned, on the whole,
lead to the conclusion that a profit a
prendre was granted.
A profit a' prendre is simply "the
and the like from

right to take soil .

another's land."
155 Tex. 469,

Munsey v. Mills & Garrity,

283 S.W. 754 (1926).

Note how

closely the definition given in 25 Am. Jur.2d,
and Licenses, section 4 at pages
414-20,

parallels the facts of the present

CJ

A profit a prendre is a right exercised
by one person in the soil of another,
accompanied with participation in the
profits of the soil, or a right to take
a part of the soil or produce of the
land.
It is therefore distinguishable
19

trom an easement, since one of the
features of an easement is the absence
of all right to participate in the
prof its of the soil charged with it.
A profit a prendre is similar to an
easement, however, in that it is an
interest in land.
It cannot be created
by parol, but is created by grant, and
may be eithPr appurtenaut to other land
or in gross.
If enjoyed by reason of
holding certain other estate, it is
regarded as appurtenant to that estate
and may not be severed therefrom. On
the other hand, if it belongs to an
individual distinct from any ownership
of other lands, it takes the character
of an estate in the land itself and is
assignable or inheritable.
Clearly the Defendant was granted such an
interest in land as described above.

In this

,·ase, 1t is a profit a' prendre in gross: it
an interest in realty in the nature of
a covenant running with the land,5 and the
Dcf2ndant has several years remaining in which
to take soil from the land pursuant thereto.
Even if the Lower Court's opinion that damages
5 see Richfield Oil Co. of Cal.
Co.,

112 Cal.App.

(1931).

20

431,

Hercules

297 Pac.

73

·peculative were correct,

it was error

not to grant the declaratory relief prayed for
by the Defendant,

confirming his right to

continue to remove the top soil under the
terms, as discussed above.
POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S DAMAGES ARE SO SPECULATIVE THAT IT
WOULD BE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THEM.
In ruling that the Defendant's
damages were so speculative that it could
not determine them,

the Lower Court mis-

the familiar rule of law which
rtquires that damages,
be

certain.

to be awarded, must

Therefore, Defendant seeks a

reversal as a matter of law.
In the first place, most cases have
modified the harshness of this doctrine by
stating that damages need be proved only
with reasonable certainty, thereby removing
the notion that an exactness is required of
21

c.1

party seeking a damage recovery.

22 Am.

Jur.2d, Damages, section 22; Dee v. San Pedro
L.A.& S.L. R. Co., 50 Utah 167, 167 Pac. 246.

In the second place, and perhaps even more
important, the requirement that damages be
proved to a reasonable certainty refers to
the fact of damages, not the amount.

Thus,

whenever the fact of injury is proved with
reasonable certainty, uncertainty as to
amount of damages will not prevent the trier
of fact from awarding damages.

Nor is mere

difficulty in the assessment of damages a
sufficient reason for refusing them.
Jur.2d, Damages, sections 22,

23,

22 Arn.

25:

v. San Pedro L.A.& S.L. R. Co., supra.
In the present case, there is
no question as to the fact of damages for
Plaintiff's breach.

The only facts presented

on the question of damages at the trial were

22

ise presented by the Defendant, and
there was no attempt by the Plaintiff to
rebut it or to introduce any contrary
evidence upon which the Court could base a
finding of no damage.

The import of the

Court's order denying damages {R. 68) is
not that whether Defendant had any damages
is speculative, but rather that such damages
as he had are speculative, i.e. the amount.
It is Defendant's position that in so ruling
the court failed to apply the rules discussed above as to determining the amount
of damages when they may be difficult to
assess or incapable of exact determination,
and thus, it presents a question of law for
this Court to decide.

The fact that Defen-

dant 1 s damages may have some uncertainty as
to the amount (on the question of lost profits).
or that they may be difficult to assess, is
no ground for denying them.
23

The damages sustained by the
Defendant, which are the natural consequences
of Plaintiff's breach, are twofold:

(1)

damages for loss of profits from 1964 to
date for Plaintiff's refusal to allow Defendant to continue to remove soil, and (2)
damages for time and money expended in
reliance upon the agreement and in preparation for performance.
1.

Loss of Profits.

While it

is true that there can be no recovery for loss
of profits where it is uncertain whether any
prof it at all would have been made, as discussed above, certainty as to amount is not
required.

In 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, section

172, we read:

But it must be borne in mind that
prospective profits are to some extent
uncertain and problematical, and so,
on that account or on account of the
difficulties in the way of proof, a
person complaining of breach of contract
is not deprived of all remedy; uncer24

tainty merely as to the amount of
profits that would have been made
does not prevent a recovery.
In the present case we have a ten
year history (from the time of the 1954 lease
agreement when Defendant began marketing the
soil to Plaintiff's repudiation and refusal
to allow further removals of soil after 1963)

in which to look for data upon which to compute loss of profits.

The evidence is un-

contradicted that Defendant was to receive
$1.60 net profit for every ton of soil removed
and sold (Exh.D7; R. 98, 99).

In addition,

Defendant was president and stockholder of
Mineral Rich Soil, Inc., one of the purchasers of the soil (R. 99), and was therefore a beneficiary of profit made by the
corporation.

As to the $1.60 per ton, the

computation of prospective profits is done
simply by multiplying $1.60 by the number
25

of tons to be sold, e.g., the sale of 260
tons in November,

1963, to Hudson and Stewart

(R. 133, 162) would bring a $416.00 net
prof it to Defendant.

The computation of

profits for the soil sold variously in 5 lb.
bags for 95 cents (R. 124, 160), 100 lb.
bags for $5.00 (R. 124, 160), 40 lb. bags
(R. 160), etc., some mixed equally with
sand (R. 165),would be more difficult as it
requires the figuring out of expenses to be
deducted, e.g., shipping, mixing, cost of
sales, etc.

(R. 99), but as pointed out, the

difficulty involved should not prevent its
being done.
The central problem (if there is
a oroblem)

involved on the loss of prof its

issue is not questions of prices and net
profit, as there is ample evidence as to
these matters and as to the value of the soil,
as discussed above.

The real question, and

a??arently the one which concerned the
Lower Court, is how does one determine
how many tons Defendant would have sold
from 1964 to date if Plaintiff had not
refused to allow him to continue removing
soil, i.e., how many 5, 40 and 100 lb. bags
would be sold, or how many more two to three
hundred ton sales such as the one to Hudson
and Stewart would be made, and would Defendant have been successful in locating what
he termed a bulk sale buyer for sales of
around 5,000 tons {R. 166).
Does this problem make the fact of
damages too speculative?

Admittedly, because

of the nature of the product and the market
(i.e., need for large buyers and need to
cultivate one's own market), it would be
difficult to be exact on one's estimate of
the probable sales, but in order to uphold
the ruling of the Trial Court, under the

law discussed above, it would have to be
that there was no showing to a reasonable certainty that Defendant would have sold
any soil at all.

Consider the following:

Here is a man who in 1954 obtains a 2-year
soil lease and conunences to develop it, sell
it, give it away to prove its value and create
a market, etc. (R. 123, 124).
(R.

Bog analyses

158) and core drillings were obtained

showing the soil was salable to a depth of
35 feet (R.

160).

Later, a stockpile was

set up for times when it would be difficult
to get soil up the canyon (R. 168).

His plans

were long range, having in 1956 obtained a
25-year extension with option to renew (Exh.
D-3).

Although the record contains no state-

ment as to the total tonnage removed from
1954 to 1964, or the total sales or profits,
there is ample evidence of the creation of a
28

market, that the soil is valuable, and was
extracted by Defendant during that period
for resale.

There is in the record an

accurate list of sales in Las Vegas, Nevada,
during 1959, primarily in the first half of th,
year.

Exhibit D-15 (three separate items)

shows these sales.

The exhibit speaks for

itself, but if counsel's addition is correct,
the total sales of soil on the three parts
of the exhibit are in the neighborhood of
$3,300.00.

It is true that Defendant had

a little trouble after that with his salesman in Las Vegas becoming ill (R. 161), but
then he located Hudson and Stewart of Texas,
as buyers (R. 130).

After that, Defendant

was prohibited from removing any more soil.
can we now say as a matter of law that there
is no showing to a reasonable certainty that
there would have been any more sales, or
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that there is nothing in the record to
indicate what kind of program Defendant was
conducting so as to afford a reasonable
basis for an estimate of the amount?

Is

Defendant to be denied recovery of lost
profits because the nature of the business
makes it a little difficult to determine?
It is respectfully submitted
that Defendant was engaged in a long-term
venture; that he showed the value of the
soil at the trial and that he was making
sales and profits at various times (R. 92,
97 I

100, 105, 123, 124, 128, 129, 131, 133,

158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166, 168: Exhs.
D-8, D-15), and that he is entitled to have
the loss of profits since 1963 determined
and be awarded the same.
2.

Expenses in Reliance.

Defen-

dant may recover not only for the net gains
which were prevented by the breach, but also
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p

tor expenses incurred in reliance on the
Plaintiff's performance of its end of the
bargain.

It should be borne in mind that

the agreement between the parties for the
removal of soil was for the profit of both
parties and that Defendant incurred expenditures and went to considerable effort to
accomplish that end.

Consider his early

efforts in creating a market, the bog analyses,
the core drillings,
the marketing

the obtaining of buyers,

methods,

advertising in news-

papers (letter attached to Exh. D-8), and
even the stockpiling of the 1600 tons in Midvale - all of these were for Plaintiff's
benefit as well as Defendant's.

He paid

out $2,500.00 in cash just to haul the soil
to the stockpile (Exh. D-1), which expenditure was in vain because Plaintiff's refusal
to allow Defendant to take more soil greatly
diminished his chances of selling the soil in

stockpile (R. 167, 168).

These expendi-

tures of time and money incurred by the
Defendant were certainly within the contemplation of the parties, being for the benefit
of both, and such are known as preparation
or part-performance damages and are recoverable
Hackersmith v. Hanley,

29 Ore. 27, 44 Pac.

497 (1896); Murphey v. Northeastern Construc-

tion Co.,

31 Ga. App. 715, 121 S.E. 848 ( 1924);

17 A.L.R.2d 1300; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages,

sections 47, 159-61.
CONCLUSION
Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law confirming his right to a
profit a' prendre in the soil on Plaintiff's
land.

This is true regardless of the dispo-

sition of the damages issues.

The terms of the

profit a' prendre are neither vague nor uncertain, and any irregularities as may exist
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because of the home drawn documents should
be resolved in favor of the obvious intent
of the parties as shown by the language of
the documents as a whole and by the conduct
of the parties thereunder.
On the damages questions, it would
appear the Court should apply the widely accepted rule that the amount of damages need
not be proved to a reasonable certainty where
the fact of damages is so proved.

A little

conjecture as to the amount is okay when not
abused; which is worse, that or allowing the
Plaintiff to breach after 10 years without
payment for loss of profits just because the
nature of Defendant's business does not easily
lend itself to an exact determination of
future profits.

Even if the Court rules

against the Defendant as to loss of profits,
the reliance damages should be awarded as
there is no speculation as to the amounts,
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e.g., $2,500.00 cost to set up the stockpile.

Respectfully submitted,
David H. Day, Esq.
David A. Goodwill, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant and
cross-Respondent
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